metaphysics in the "Transcendental Dialectic" of the Critique of Pure Reason rests, as is often forgotten, on the rejection in the "Analytic of Principles" of the "proud name of ... ontology."5 Thus, within a simple history of concepts, metaphysics is defined as follows: the system of philosophy from Suarez to Kant as a single science bearing at one and the same time on the universal of common being and on the being (or the beings) par excellence. This textual fact seems hard to contest.
But the fact remains to be interpreted. The historically narrow sense of metaphysics follows from its strict definition; but, precisely, can we confirm this notion conceptually? Can we read in it anything more than a scholastic, or even pedagogical, nomenclature that is without any authentically speculative scope and that is, in any case, incapable of bringing us to the heart of the question of metaphysics? This suspicion would be a serious threat if we did not have at our disposal a conceptual elaboration of this common notion of "metaphysics"-the elaboration furnished by Heidegger in the section of Identity and Difference entitled "The Ontotheological Constitution of Metaphysics." Here we will focus on only one thesis from that decisive text. Indeed, the principal difficulty of metaphysical science does stem from the problematic character of its unity. Of course, it would remain to be known whether ontologia, in its historical acceptation (from Goclenius to Johann Clauberg), ever claimed to accomplish anything more and anything other than a "simple analytic of pure understanding," since it never claimed being as its object, but only the cogitabile (see the documents gathered in Courtine, Suarez et le systeme de la metaphysique, pp. 246-93, 422-35). Has the hypothesis ever been taken seriously that "ontology," understood historically, never dared to confront being as such? Wouldn't this fact have to call into question the immediate possibility of a science of being as being that would not, first, be a science of being as thinkable and therefore a submission of the ens in quantum ens to representation? Wouldn't one have to be amazed that the very term ontologia remained unknown to Aristotle and the medievals and was established only by the moderns, in a situation that was explicitly assumed as Cartesian The inner unity of "metaphysics," which allows it not to fall apart into two unconnected sciences, stems from the fact that, between the science of being in general and the science of the being par excellence, the single institution of the ground is at work in modes that are intrinsically conciliated. Common Being grounds beings, even the beings par excellence; in return, the being par excellence, in the mode of causality, grounds common Being: "Being grounds beings, and beings, as what is most of all, cause Being" ["griindet Sein das Seiende, begriindet das Seiende als das Seiendste das Sein"] (ID, p. 68; p. 69). In and beyond the scholastic notion of "metaphysics," the onto-theo-logical constitution thus brings out the ultimate concept of "metaphysics" by recognizing its unity in the intersecting conciliation of the ground (by beings as such) with the ground in the mode of causality (by the supreme being). We admit to having at our disposal no other rigorous determination of "metaphysics," that is, no other determination that is historically confirmed and conceptually operative. Because the determination remains precise it renders thinkable the possibility of "metaphysics" as also its impossibility. And for this reason, too, the determination eventually renders intelligible the relief that goes beyond metaphysics and takes it up again in a higher figure.
3
The definition that renders metaphysics intelligible also allows the thought that "metaphysics" might become impossible. of the possible necessarily implies both these postulations, with equal right. The reciprocal foundation of onto-theo-logy offers a working hypothesis-in my eyes the most powerful-for the historian of philosophy. It also allows us to understand how it was possible to speak of an "end of metaphysics." Nietzsche's critique of philosophy as a Platonism to be inverted and subverted is in fact perfectly in line with the Heideggerian hypothesis. For that critique amounts first of all to a critique of the concept of being in general, reduced to the undistinguished level of one of the "'highest concepts,' which means the most general, the emptiest concepts, the last smoke of evaporating reality." 7 Nietzsche here contests the legitimacy of an abstraction in general from matter and from the sensible, and thus the traditional condition of possibility for a science of being in general [metaphysica generalis]. Reciprocally, Nietzsche denies that any being par excellence might, from an imperceptible otherworld, exercise over common being the function of foundation (and, within his problematic, of "vengeance"). Neither as logical principle, nor as universal cause, nor as "moral God," is the least causa sui any longer admissible. Why would beings as such, that is, as sensible, necessitate that another being overdetermine them as their ground? Why, then, would that which is furthermore have to be grounded-instead of answering for itself by itself alone? The original function of the science of the being par excellence [metaphysica specialis] is thus called into question. This double disqualification is finally unified in the single identification between becoming (common being, metaphysica generalis) and Being (the being par excellence, metaphysica specialis): "To impose the seal of Being on becoming ... -the height of speculation!" 8 Nothing can ground since nothing calls for or necessitates a ground. Metaphysics no longer has grounds for being, nor Being a metaphysical ground.9 Nietzsche therefore confirms negatively the Heideggerian definition of metaphysics as the onto-theo-logical system of reciprocal foundation between the being par excellence and common being.
What must be concluded from this? First, something obvious: the definition of metaphysics that is most pertinent, both historically and conceptually, also allows one to challenge it. The thought of the ground, precisely because it can account for beings as a whole, can also be denied as ground. For if the ground imposes itself metaphysically through its To refuse the fact of the "end of metaphysics," moreover, seems even less defensible insofar as it is a matter of a transitive concept. Its transitivity is formulated as follows: just as the onto-theo-logical definition of metaphysics directly implies at least the possibility of the "end of metaphysics," so the "end of metaphysics" directly implies the possibility of the "end of the end of metaphysics.""I There is no paradox in this: as soon as "metaphysics" admits of a concept that is precise, historically verifiable, and theoretically operative, it follows that this concept can undergo a critique proportionate to its limits but also offer, thanks to those very limits, the possible horizon of its overcoming. It is, on the contrary, as long as the concept of "metaphysics" is lacking that the question, beyond its crisis, also remains closed concerning the philosophy to come and thus present philosophy. The "end" of "metaphysics" fixes its limits and thus sets its end, that end itself remains fertile with a still-intact purpose for philosophy. The transitivity of "metaphysics" leads not only to its "end" but also to its own overcomingmore than a metaphysics at its limit, a meta-metaphysics.
At the point where we still stand, it remains that the "end of metaphysics" exerts itself most visibly on one privileged point-the being par excellence. Indeed, if the figure of the foundation no longer allows us in general to legitimate the concept of "metaphysics," it follows in particular that the assimilation of God with the function of ultimate ground becomes (or can become) illegitimate. This identification runs through the entire course of philosophy and its metaphysical figure; but it always interprets this ground on the basis of effectivity or actuality: "T f oboita v Fv 9pyEta" according to Aristotle; "purus actus non habens aliquid de potentialitate" for Aquinas; "causa sui" following Descartes; "sufficient Reason for the universe" with Leibniz.'2 By "God," metaphysics therefore means the being par excellence that operates as and through efficiency such that, in the metaphysica specialis, it can thereby ensure a ground for every common being. The "end of metaphysics" provokes the "death" of this "God." But, against the aggressive or resigned commonplaces that seize upon this theoretical event, one must also measure its true scope. It is not a matter of denying the least greatness to this determination of the divine by the efficiency of the ground, nor is it a matter of underestimating its theoretical fecundity. It is simply a matter of honestly posing this question: Does the effectivity of the ground allow to be thought truly the way in which God is God, even in philosophy? Even for the "God of the philosophers and the scholars," do "causa sui," "sufficient Reason," "purus actus," or "Avepye•ta" offer a name that is sufficiently divine to make God appear? At the very least, it is impossible today not to admit if only the possibility of a suspicion. Now, it is this simple possibility that suffices to recognize, in the "end of metaphysics," the "death of God." For the divinity of God should not be capable of lacking. If therefore it is lacking, if only imperceptibly, then God is already no longer at issuebut rather "God," who by his quotation marks is stigmatized as an idol.
If the "death of God" in philosophy belongs essentially to the "end of metaphysics," if the latter follows essentially from the concept of "meta- The formula "principle of all principles" must not lead us astray. The principle here is that there is not any principle at all, if at least by principle we mean that which precedes, "that starting from which."16 Or, in other words, what takes the place of a principle, namely intuition as donation, always precedes the consciousness of it that we receive as after the fact. The reduplication of the "principle" displayed by the "principle of principles" therefore must especially not be understood as the statement of another principle (after those of identity or of sufficient reason) that would be more essentially a priori than the preceding ones but rather, in the manner of a superlative, as the (non)principle that surpasses all the previous principles insofar as it states that in the beginning there is no (transcendental) a priori principle but indeed an intuitive a posteriori: donation precedes all and always. Unambiguously, therefore, phenomenology goes beyond metaphysics in the strict measure that it gets rid of any a priori principle in order to admit donation, which is originary precisely insofar as it is a posteriori for the one who receives it. Phenomenology goes beyond metaphysics insofar as it gives up the transcendental project in order to allow the development of an empiricism that is finally radical-'" finally radical because it no longer limits itself to sensible intuition but admits all originarily donating intuition.
This reversal of the a priori principle in favor of the a posteriori immediately entails two determinative theses concerning ontologia and ground, respectively. The first follows directly from donation: the appearance of phenomena is operative without having recourse (at least necessarily and in the first instance) to Being. Indeed, here it is a matter of any "intuition" whatsoever, of the fact of its "giving itself," and of "fleshly presence." These three terms suffice to define the perfect phenomenality of a phenomenon without in any way having recourse, for all that, to Being, to beings, and even less to an "objective concept of being." One might legitimately ask whether every phenomenon, inasmuch as appearing, does not at least initially dispense with Being-a phenomenon without Being. Consequently, phenomenology could free itself absolutely not only from all metaphysica generalis (ontologia),'8 but also from the ques- As lucid as it may be, this objection remains convincing only if one ignores two arguments. (a) In the hypothesis where a giver would indeed correspond to the being-given, the giver would be equivalent to a (metaphysical) ground only if it kept the status of a being and only if the donation of the being-given made by the giver were still comprehended within the horizon of causality understood as efficiency. But neither of these assumptions is self-evident. It could be, on the contrary, that donation can arise only once causality has been radically surpassed, in a mode whose own rationality causality does not even suspect. It could be that donation obeys requirements that are infinitely more complex and powerful than the resources of efficient causality. Moreover, even in the history of metaphysics, the sudden appearance of efficient causality in the field of "God" marks more the decline than the consecration of theologia rationalis-Leibniz was the equally lucid and powerless witness of this. The objection thus betrays that it depends on metaphysics much more than does the thesis that it contests, since it cannot prevent itself from understanding that thesis hastily and from the start in a metaphysical fashion. (b) A second argument, however, renders these precautions useless. For the answer to the being-given does not assume the figure of the giver but that of the being-given par excellence. If the world can be defined as what appears as the being-given in its totality, if the "I/me" can be designated as what appears as the closest being-given, then "God" would be determined as the being-given par excellence. That excellence indicates neither sufficiency, nor efficiency, nor principality, but the fact that he gives himself and allows to be given more than any other beinggiven. In short, with "God" it is a question of the being-abandoned. 31 The phenomenological figure of"God" as the being-given par excellence can be outlined by following the guiding thread of donation itself. (a) That he is the given par excellence implies that "God" is given without restriction, without reserve, without restraint. "God" is given not at all partially, following this or that outline, like a constituted object that nevertheless offers to the intentional gaze only a specific side of its sensible visibility, leaving to appresentation the duty of giving further that which does not give itself, but absolutely, without the reserve of any outline, with every side open, in the manner of the objects whose dimensions cubist painting caused to explode, in order that all aspects might bejuxtaposed, despite the constraints of perspective. "God" is found given with- Quite obviously, these theses could not here be given an entirely adequate development. They nevertheless will suffice to indicate what new path phenomenology shows, beyond the metaphysics that it relieves, to philosophy-and without returning to the metaphysica specialis. And on that path, the rational thought of God, which philosophy cannot forget without losing its own dignity, or even its mere possibility, finds at least a certain coherence.
